Grundy (1987)

Amongst other things, Grundy introduces Habermas' three cognitive INTERESTS:

1. Technical
2. Practical, and
3. Emancipatory

This is reminiscent, to me at least of Flyvbjerg’s (2001) taxonomy of knowledge (PDED791 Assignment 2) as comprising:

1. Techne (pragmatic knowledge),
2. Episteme (theoretical knowledge), and
3. Phronesis (practical and context-dependent deliberation about values).

It is also reminiscent of the often cited three 'learning domains' of:

1. Psychomotor,
2. Cognitive, and
3. Affective (including the axiological) domains )

Gundy (1987) equates Habermas' interests to:

1. Empirical-analytic
2. Historical-hermeneutic (interpretive), and
3. Critical

I find Habermas' concept of 'Emancipatory Interest' quite intriguing. At first glance it appears self-serving as 'pure-interest'. For Habermas emancipation meant 'independence from all that is outside the individual" a state of autonomy rather than libertinism. However, Grundy argues (as I suspect Foucault might agree) that whilst emancipation must ultimately be an individual experience, if it is to have any reality, it is not simply an individual matter because of the interactive nature of human society. This seems to be arguing for a co-created reality as the appropriate setting for knowledge.

When I read that emancipatory cognitive interest could be defined as "a fundamental interest in emancipation and empowerment to engage in autonomous action arising out of authentic, critical insights into the social construction of human society" I feel I am dealing with a cosnturctivist realoity. I owuld be more comfortable with a definition along the lines "a fundamental interest in emancipation and empowerment to engage in collaborative action arising out of authentic, critical insights into the social construction of human society" that to me is the essence of a participatory worldview.